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WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 6

WASHINGTON
Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 51 P. 3d 800 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that an earlier adjudication of water rights resulting in a
decree was a general adjudication of all the water rights within the
river basin and the plaintiff was therefore precluded from asserting a
water right that their predecessors failed to assert at that time).
Acquavella, U.S. Timberlands Yakima L.L.C. ("Timberlands")
asserted a claim for water rights that the Washington Department of
Ecology ("Ecology") denied because the rights were not asserted
earlier in a 1921 water adjudication. The Superior Court of Yakima
County affirmed this denial of water rights and Timberlands appealed.
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court and the
Ecology's denial of Timberlands' asserted rights, holding that
Timberlands was precluded from asserting water rights that their
predecessors failed to assert in the 1921 adjudication resulting in the
Amosso Decree.
In 1917, Washington enacted a state Water Code that declared all
waters within the state to be the property of the public, with the
exception of then existing rights. The code also provided that any
future rights would only be obtained through appropriation, in the
manner provided by the Revised Code of Washington ("RCW"). The
RCW described the Washington state water permit system. Prior to
1917, the Washington legislature had not addressed water rights, and
the courts recognized water rights under both the riparian and prior
appropriation systems. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Washington
decided in Department of Ecology v. Abbott, that riparian owners should
have been given an adequate time to learn about the 1917 Water
Code, and determined that such time was fifteen years. Therefore,
water diversions after 1932 required a state permit.
In 1921, the state hydraulic engineer set in motion the Amosso
adjudication to determine the water rights to the Teanaway River.
Timberlands argued that this adjudication did not encompass all rights
to Teanaway water, but instead covered only lands then under
irrigation. The superior court rejected this argument because the
language of the Amosso referee's report and the subsequent decree
both indicated that more than that was at stake. In fact, the decree's
ownership list included one of Timberlands' predecessors, Cascade
Lumber, but did not have a recorded right to divert at the ten points
that Timberlands asserted in this adjudication. The superior court
held, and the court of appeals here affirmed, the Amosso decree was
representative of a general adjudication and it therefore barred
Timberlands from asserting a water right not earlier asserted or
recognized in the 1921 adjudication. Section 90.03.220 of the RCW
memorializes the application of resjudicata to water adjudications.
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Timberlands also argued that all adjudications prior to 1979 were
not general adjudications encompassing the total water rights to a
stream. Timberlands based this argument on a 1979 addition to the
Water Code that stated water rights subject to determination
proceedings described in RCW sections 90.03.110 through 90.03.240
include all rights to the use of water. Timberlands argued that prior to
this addition, adjudications did not include all water rights in a stream,
and therefore its predecessor was not required to assert their rights in
the 1921 adjudication. The superior court quickly disregarded this
argument because the process of adjudication has remained
substantially the same since the 1917 Water Code was put into effect,
and the 1979 changes served merely as clarification. The court of
appeals found no error in the superior court's disposition of this
argument.
Timberlands next argued that the superior court wrongly denied
them an exception to the application of res judicata because of the
great injustice they would suffer. Timberlands based this claim on its
continuous use of water and that of its predecessors, along with the
necessity of the water for their timber management operations. The
court of appeals however, recognized the limited nature of the
exceptions to res judicata and held that the superior court properly
applied resjudicata to the current adjudication of water rights.
Timberlands also maintained that its predecessor revived a water
right by exercising riparian rights between 1921 and 1932. The court
of appeals held here that though Cascade Lumber, and later Boise
Cascade, used water during those years, perfecting a water right by
such use was impossible because the 1921 adjudication settled all
rights in the Teanaway River. At that time, the adjudication reserved
any unasserted rights to the public and precluded adverse possession
claims against the state.
Timberlands' final two claims addressed the fairness of the
disposition of the case. First, the court of appeals held that there was
not a violation of due process because Timberlands' predecessor
received notice of the original adjudication in 1921. Second, the court
of appeals held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to exercise its equitable powers to confirm
Timberlands' water right. Though Timberlands used water from the
Teanaway River in the past, the actual parties to the 1921 adjudication
had a right to rely on that decree. Furthermore, failure of a
predecessor to assert a water right, for whatever reason, does not
indicate fraud, concealment, or bad faith, the normal causes for
equitable relief. Timberlands' predecessor may have had an existing
vested right to the waters of the Teanaway River that would have been
recognized by the 1921 adjudication, but they failed to assert it.
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